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Abstract 
Statistical reasoning is an integral part of modern scientific practice. In The Seven 
Pillars of Statistical Wisdom Stephen Stigler presents seven core ideas, or pillars, of 
statistical thinking and the historical developments of each of these pillars, many of 
which were concurrent with developments in biology. Here we focus on Stigler's fifth 
pillar, regression, and his discussion of how regression to the mean came to be 
thought of as a solution to a challenge for the theory of natural selection. Stigler 
argues that the purely mathematical phenomenon of regression to the mean 
provides a resolution to a problem for Darwin's evolutionary theory. Thus, he argues 
that the resolution to the problem for Darwin's theory is purely mathematical, rather 
than causal. We show why this argument is problematic. 
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Introduction 
Modern scientific reasoning is largely based on statistical tools and methods. In The 
Seven Pillars of Statistical Wisdom (Harvard University Press, 2016) Stephen Stigler 
sets forth to present the seven core ideas, or pillars, that are at the base of statistical 
thinking, in an attempt to give an answer to the question "what exactly is statistics?". 
Both a professor of statistics and a distinguished historian of the field, Stigler does 
not only describe each of the seven pillars, but also provides an account of their 
historical development, with each chapter in the book dedicated to one of the 
pillars. Philosophers of science and biology will greatly benefit from the book, which 
clearly explains complicated statistical ideas and their development; ideas that are 
essential for a good understanding of scientific methodology. Many of the episodes 
discussed in the book concern the interaction between the development of statistics 
and the development of biology. In what follows, we briefly present each of the 
chapters of the book and then discuss at greater length Stigler's description in 
chapter 5 of the concept of regression to the mean, as well as his arguments 
regarding the explanatory value of this concept in evolutionary biology. The 
arguments presented in this chapter are highly relevant to philosophers of biology 
and relate to the philosophical debate about mathematical explanations in science.  
After presenting Stigler's analysis we explain where we find it wanting.  
The first chapter in Stigler's book deals with the discovery of the notion of data 
aggregation, that is, the idea that a statistical summary of a collection of data (such 
as an average) can provide us with more information than can be obtained by simply 
attending to individual data items. Stigler clearly demonstrates how radical this idea 
was prior to its acceptance, as it involves the counter-intuitive argument that in 
order to gain information we should discard parts of the data we gathered (the 
individual items, the order in which they were gathered, etc.). The second chapter, 
which deals with the concept of information, presents the development of another 
counter-intuitive conclusion, namely that the accuracy of our inferences does not 
increase proportionally with the amount of data we gather. The more data we 
gather, the less each new piece of data contributes to the accuracy of the 
investigation. This leads, for example, to the non-intuitive realization that the second 
20 observations we make are not as valuable to our inferences as the first 20 
observations we made, even though they would have been more valuable had they 
been the first 20 observations to be gathered (which would render the other 20 
observations less valuable). 
The third chapter deals with the concept of likelihood, which is necessary when we 
try to understand whether some data supports or contradicts a belief or a hypothesis 
we have. To do that, we need to be able to determine whether data that were 
gathered support or go against a hypothesis. Philosophers will be aware of the 
discussion of the law of likelihood by Ian Hacking (2016 [1965]) and, more recently, 
by Deborah Mayo (1996) and Elliott Sober (2008).  The most common method in use 
to determine whether our data supports or contradicts a hypothesis is Null 
Hypothesis Significance Testing, in which the data is tested against a null hypothesis, 
and the hypothesis is accepted if the probability of the data given this null 
hypothesis (its p-value) is low enough (usually less than 0.05). The uncritical 
acceptance and use of significance tests in many scientific fields has long been 
known, and the historical development of the concept of likelihood and significance 
testing provided by Stigler is an accessible way to understand the foundational 
debates through which these ideas developed. It is particularly enlightening given 
the current "Replication Crisis" to recall the historical debate between Fisher and 
Neyman and Egon Pearson.  
The fourth chapter deals with intercomparison, the idea that some inferences can be 
made solely on the basis of an analysis of the interior variation in the data. That is, 
some inferences can be made without any exterior reference. For example, the p-
value of an empirical result can be inferred based on the standard deviation in our 
sample, without any reference to the exact standard deviation in the entire 
population.  As usual key innovations were made by Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, 
and Ronald Fisher.  Galton used intercomparison in his infamous 1869 book, 
Hereditary Genius, allowing him to use biographical dictionaries to compare talent in 
populations without having to explicitly define talent. 
 The fifth chapter deals with the concept of regression. We elaborate on this chapter 
in the next section. The sixth chapter deals with the design of experiments, and how 
the planned statistical analysis of results should guide this design. It is common 
wisdom that well-designed experiments are necessary for a thorough statistical 
analysis to be possible, and that a statistical analysis cannot fix a study that was not 
designed well. Stigler's discussion goes further to show how combining the right 
design and statistical methods yielded new insights that were not available before. 
Stigler highlights a lovely quote from Fisher who wrote that "Nature…  will best 
respond to a logical and carefully thought out questionnaire; indeed, if we ask her a 
single question, she will often refuse to answer until some other topic has been 
discussed." (p. 153). This flies against the older tradition, still very much alive today, 
which considers good experiments to be ones that ask a single, often dichotomous, 
question. For example, Stigler demonstrates how additive models helped to 
recognize the causal effects of factors such as seeds and fertilizers in agriculture by 
comparing several multi-factor treatments simultaneously (different seeds, different 
fertilizers) and measuring the variation between all the treatments. These effects 
would not have been recognized had only treatment for one factor been made, 
while ignoring the variation in outcome that is due to other factors. Fisher developed 
these techniques while doing agricultural research at Rothamsted Experimental 
Station.  Another interesting topic Stigler discusses in this chapter is the introduction 
of randomization to experimental design, which helps making inferences without the 
need to make assumptions about normality which would otherwise be required.  
Stigler's discussion of the role of randomization in making statistical inferences valid 
and even at times in establishing what he calls the "objects of inference" is highly 
interesting and thought-provoking.  
The seventh chapter deals with the concept of residual, the idea that complicated 
phenomena can be accounted for by first subtracting the effects of known causes 
and then referring to the remaining effects as those that require further explanation. 
Stigler shows how the logic of this idea led to the development of statistical methods 
of comparison of complex models in scientific practice.  
While each and every one of the pillars raises interesting philosophical questions, 
and has an interesting history often related to biology, we find Stigler's discussion of 
the fifth pillar, regression, to be of special interest to philosophers of biology. We 
turn now to the issues we have with Stigler's discussion of Francis Galton's work on 
inheritance and what its implications were for Natural Selection.  
Darwin's problem and regression to the mean 
The fifth chapter in Stigler's book describes Francis Galton's work on inheritance and 
his discovery of regression to the mean. We find this chapter of great interest to 
philosophers of biology for several reasons. First, it describes a problem with 
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection that is much less often recognized 
than the famous problem articulated by Fleeming Jenkin (i.e., the problem posed to 
the theory by blending inheritance). Second, Stigler provides a highly informative 
description of how Galton worked towards a solution to this problem using a 
physical model to represent and understand the inherited variation of characters 
across generations. Thus, the chapter can be of interest to those philosophers 
concerned with modelling. Third, Stigler argues that the solution to the problem is 
mathematical rather than causal, but we are not quite sure that this is correct (more 
on this in a minute). This connects directly with the literature on mathematical 
explanations and their differences and relations to causal explanations. 1 
Stigler starts his discussion of Galton's work with a description of a problem in 
Darwin's theory of natural selection that only Galton seemed to have recognized. 
Darwin's theory is built on the core assumption that each parent produces offspring 
that are not identical to it, and thus creates what Stigler refers to as 
intergenerational variability. In other words, parents create additional variation in 
the population when they reproduce. This pattern of inheritance seems to imply that 
the overall variation in the population will increase with every generation, since each 
reproduction event adds to the variation in the population. However, this is not what 
we observe in nature: in most species the distribution of character traits tends to 
stay the same across generations (even with no apparent selection). 
                                                           
1 An important debate concerning the relation between mathematical and causal explanations in the 
philosophy of biology literature is the debate over whether explanations of population change that 
refer to natural selection and random drift are causal or mathematical explanations (e.g. Walsh et al. 
2002; Shapiro & Sober 2007). We will not discuss how our analysis of Stigler's views relates to this 
debate. 
So, while Darwin's assumption about intergenerational variability leads to the 
conclusion that the variation in characters should increase with each generation, in 
effect we see that the variation remains quite the same. This of course casts doubt 
on Darwin's assumption that reproduction events contribute to the variation in the 
population, without which his theory cannot work, and thus creates a problem for 
the structure of the theory. Hence, the problem Galton identified (which Stigler 
refers to as "Darwin's problem" (pp. 130, 131)) is that intergenerational variability 
and stable variation across generations seem to be in conflict, and need to be 
reconciled in order for Darwin's theory to work. In other words, to overcome the 
problem an explanation is needed for the fact that offspring traits are distributed 
around parental traits, yet the overall population distribution does not change from 
generation to generation. This problem is related to a more general concern, namely 
that for natural selection to operate populations need to harbor sufficient variation 
and such variation must therefore be maintained. Darwin's problem, as Stigler here 
identifies it, is a special case of this more general concern, since sufficient variation 
need not be the result of having stable intergenerational variation.  Galton tried to 
find an explanation for intergenerational stability in variation, while offspring traits 
are distributed around parental ones, by looking for a force that "counteracted the 
increased variability yet also conformed with heritable intergenerational variation" 
(p. 115). In other words, he looked for a causal explanation. 2 
 
Stigler provides a clear and illuminating description of how Galton worked towards a 
solution to his problem, which we will follow in our discussion. Galton invented and 
used a device called the quincunx, in which lead balls fall through rows of pins from 
the top of the device to one of several compartments at the bottom. At each row of 
                                                           
2 An alternative interpretation of this chapter is that Stigler describes two distinct problems: 
"Darwin's problem" being the maintenance of sufficient variation in natural populations and "Galton's 
version of Darwin's problem" being the problem of the apparent conflict between intergenerational 
variability and stable variation. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. We prefer our 
reading of the chapter and note that in the section "The Solution to Darwin's Problem", Stigler 
describes only one problem, which is the problem we focus on here. The alternative interpretation 
does not fundamentally affect our argument, which is concerned with Galton's solution for the 
problem of the apparent conflict between intergenerational variability and stable variation in natural 
populations.  
pins, after the ball hits one of the pins it has the same chance of falling to the right or 
to the left of the pin. This implies that each ball is most likely to reach the bottom 
compartment which is directly below the location where it was dropped. The balls 
are less likely to reach the compartments that are further to the left or to the right, 
and thus after a series of balls are dropped from the center we get a bell-shaped 
distribution of balls, with the majority of the balls laying at the center compartment 
and fewer laying at the edges.  
The quincunx was used by Galton to represent the variation within a population and 
to demonstrate how this variation can contribute to the variation in the next 
generation. We can refer to the compartments at the bottom of the quincunx as 
representing the values of a given trait, say height, with middle compartments 
representing medium height, the compartments to the left representing lower 
heights, and the ones to the right representing higher heights. The balls in each 
compartment represent the number of individuals that possess each value of the 
trait, and thus the normal distribution of balls across the compartments after a series 
of drops from the center of the device represents the normal distribution of height 
in the population. Furthermore, if we imagine that we release the balls that are now 
distributed across the bottom compartments for another "round" in the quincunx, 
we can infer the amount of variation in the following generation. The balls will fall 
from their current locations and end in new compartments at the bottom, and this 
represents the distribution of the trait in the following generation. 
Now, if we release a population of balls that are distributed normally for a second 
round in the quincunx, what we get is a larger range of variation at the end of the 
second round (i.e., in the third generation). The balls at the edges are now quite 
likely to end even further to the right or to the left (even though they are most likely 
to end at the same location from which they were dropped). This, of course, is a 
simple demonstration of what was said earlier about Darwin's assumption, namely 
that intergenerational variation leads to the expectation of ever increasing variation 
in the overall population. Galton used the quincunx to try and explain how such 
intergenerational variation can occur while the overall variation in the population 
remains the same, and in 1877 he came up with a possible explanation. If we let the 
balls that are distributed across the compartments fall only from the compartments 
at the center of the quincunx, the distribution will be compressed before it will be 
subjected to further variation, and if we compress it enough, the variation will 
increase only to the same range of variation that exists in the parent generation. He 
named the factors that are responsible for this compression 'inclined chutes'. 
However, he did not have a good explanation of what accounted for the occurrence 
of such a compression in natural populations. 
Galton kept searching for evidence for the compression of intergenerational 
variation in natural populations represented by the inclined chutes. He gathered a 
large amount of data about heights of parents and children and noticed that the 
average height of children was not the average parental height, but rather a value 
that is closer to the average value of the population. In other words, Galton noted 
that tall fathers have sons who are taller than average, but to a lesser extent than 
the fathers and hence closer to the population mean. This seemed like evidence for 
the operation of the inclined chutes, but Galton also noticed that the same pattern is 
observed when he averaged groups of children, with the parents of each group of 
children showing an average height that is closer to the population average (p. 123). 
Furthermore, he discovered that the pattern is observed yet again in data gathered 
from pairs of brothers, such that for a group of individuals with a given average 
height, grouping their siblings does not yield the same average height, but once 
again a height which is closer to the average in the overall population. 
Galton concluded that the phenomenon he observed was not a biological 
phenomenon at all but rather a statistical one, which we now refer to as regression 
to the mean. Put formally, for a given value of X the predicted value of Y using 
ordinary least squared regression, is fewer standard deviations from its own mean 
than X is from its mean. 
Stigler goes beyond noting that regression to the mean is a mathematical 
phenomenon. He argues in addition that regression to the mean solves Darwin's 
problem presented above. 3 Stigler does not provide an account of what makes an 
explanation a mathematical explanation, as opposed to a causal one, and in what 
sense is regression to the mean a mathematical phenomenon4. But recent years 
have seen a growing literature on the nature of mathematical explanations, which 
can shed light on this question. There is somewhat of a consensus among different 
accounts of mathematical explanations that explanations using regression to the 
mean are indeed mathematical. André Ariew, Collin Rice and Yasha Rohwer argue 
that an explanation is mathematical if the explanandum can be deduced as a 
consequence of some mathematical facts without citing any specific causes (Ariew et 
al. 2015).5 Thus, these authors argue that Galton's explanation using regression to 
the mean is mathematical because it shows how the existence of stable variation 
and intergenerational variability can be deduced from mathematical parameters 
which determine a normal distribution (Ariew et al. 2015, p. 645). Similar arguments 
regarding the mathematical nature of Galton's explanation using regression to the 
mean were made by Sober (1980) and Hacking (1990), whom these authors cite as 
well. Marc Lange provides a different account of mathematical explanations, 
according to which an explanation is mathematical if the explanandum is shown to 
be the result of mathematical facts, and these facts seem to account for the 
explanandum to a stronger degree than any causal facts could account for it (Lange 
2013a). Lange also takes explanations using regression to the mean to be 
mathematical (he claims they belong to a sub-type of mathematical explanations he 
calls "Really Statistical" explanations), because these explanations show that the 
explanandum is simply "a statistical fact of life" (Lange 2013b, p. 173). 
                                                           
3It is important to note that this is Stigler's argument, not necessarily Galton's. We are not providing 
an interpretation of Galton's work in this paper, but rather analyze Stigler's interpretation in his 
analysis of Galton's work. 
4 From this point on, whenever we speak of mathematical explanations we mean pure mathematical 
explanations. That is, explanations that are mathematical rather than causal.  
5 These authors take explanations for population changes that appeal to natural selection or drift to 
be mathematical and not causal because these changes "can be explained by referring to the 
deductive consequences of statistical models, independent of considerations of causation" (Ariew et 
al. 2015, p. 636). They note that to be explanatory, it is not sufficient that the explanandum will 
simply be deduced from the mathematical facts. The mathematical facts need to also provide 
counterfactual information, by telling us "how things would have been different in various 
counterfactual situations" (Ariew et al. 2015, p. 655).  
While Ariew et al, Sober, and Hacking describe the mathematical nature of Galton's 
explanation using regression to the mean, none of them discusses whether this 
explanation resolves Darwin's problem. However, Stigler in the book goes further, to 
argue that regression to the mean is the resolution of Darwin's problem, and thus 
that the resolution to this problem is purely mathematical. According to Stigler, the 
apparent conflict between stable variation across generations and Darwin's 
requirement of intergenerational variability was resolved once Galton discovered 
that the two can coexist due to regression to the mean. In a section titled "The 
Solution to Darwin's Problem" Stigler writes: "The problem Galton had identified 
was not a problem after all, but was instead due to a statistical effect that no one 
had identified before. Population equilibrium [i.e. stable variation] and 
intergenerational variability were not in conflict" (p. 130, our italics). Stigler further 
argues, in regards to Darwin's problem, that "…[Galton] showed that, properly 
understood, there was no problem" (p. 131). In other words, Stigler argues that once 
regression to the mean was discovered, Darwin's problem turned out to be a pseudo 
problem, since evidence for both stable variation and intergenerational variability in 
a population were not contradictory.6 
However, we find it hard to see how regression to the mean by itself can fully explain 
the coexistence of intergenerational variability and stable variation and resolve 
Darwin's problem. As the quotes in the paragraph above indicate, Stigler argues that 
the problem was solved because the discovery of regression to the mean showed 
that stable variation and intergenerational variability were not in conflict. But what 
was really shown with the discovery of regression to the mean, and we believe 
Stigler will agree on that, is that stable variation and intergenerational variability 
were not necessarily in conflict. That is, regression to the mean is a phenomenon 
that includes the co-occurrence of stable variation and intergenerational variability, 
implying that the two can co-occur. But this means that Galton's discovery of 
regression to the mean only suggested that an explanation for Darwin's problem is 
possible, it did not solve it. In order to be a full resolution to Darwin's problem, it 
                                                           
6 The argument made here by Stigler, namely that regression to the mean solved Darwin's problem, 
did not appear in his earlier works on Galton and Darwin's problems (e.g. Stigler 2010). We thank an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
must be clarified why an explanation using regression to the mean in fact applies to 
natural populations. 
While it is a general phenomenon, deducing regression to the mean requires making 
statistical assumptions, in particular about the distributions involved. It is easy to 
imagine a situation in which there is intergenerational variation between parents 
and offspring in such a way that there is no stable variation and regression to the 
mean does not occur. This is the case in the ever-expanding range of variation case 
Stigler begins his discussion with, as well as in blending inheritance, probably the 
objection that most worried Darwin. Moreover, stable variation entails regression to 
the mean, but regression to the mean does not entail stable variation. Once you 
have stable variation, that is the parental and offspring generations have the same 
distribution of traits, the central assumption for mathematically deducing regression 
to the mean is satisfied. Not the other way around.  
Thus, in order to convincingly conclude that regression to the mean is the 
explanation why stable variation and intergenerational variability which are 
observed in natural populations co-occur it is not enough to understand the 
phenomenon of regression to the mean. One must also show why the preconditions 
for the occurrence of regression to the mean apply to the populations involved. In 
the case of the natural populations that are relevant to Darwin's problem, some 
causal account of how traits are inherited must be given since, as noted above, traits 
may be inherited in ways that would not make it possible to explain away Darwin's 
problem by appeal to regression to the mean. Thus, Darwin's problem was resolved 
and received a satisfactory explanation once the Mendelian account of genetic 
inheritance explained intergenerational variability and stable variation. Hence, we 
argue, the resolution to this problem was not purely mathematical. 
It seems more enlightening to understand Galton's work as elucidating the 
mathematical conditions of correlation between parents and offspring and 
regression to the mean; conditions that shed light on properties the causal 
inheritance systems should possess. But this of course does not contradict the fact 
that only a good understanding of these causal details of inheritance could provide a 
full explanation of the coexistence of intergenerational variability and stable 
variation and resolve Darwin's problem. Thus, Galton's mathematical explanation 
should not be thought of as replacing the causal explanation focusing on the 
inheritance system. The two explanations are not independent of one another; each 
sheds light and constrains the other.7  
How does this interpretation sit with the correct and well known observation that 
regression to the mean is a statistical phenomenon not a causal one? The thing to 
note is that the question of predicting traits of offspring from those of parents, 
which is what Galton was studying, is indeed a statistical question. Galton discovered 
that regression to the mean does not require an independent causal explanation, 
being a manifestation of how the statistical expectation is derived. Darwin's problem 
as defined above is different. It deals with actual multi-generational variation. What 
Darwin's problem amounts to is how genetic inheritance produces intergenerational 
variability and stable variation. This is a causal question. Galton's problem, in 
contrast, involved the interpretation of evidence. What seemed like contradictory 
conclusions from collected data turned out not to be contradictory. This conundrum 
had a mathematical explanation.  
Concluding remarks 
Stigler's book provides a valuable account of the core ideas in statistics and their 
historical development. Anyone interested in statistical reasoning and more 
generally in modern scientific practice will find the themes in the book highly 
interesting. Furthermore, the discussion of regression to the mean and Darwin's 
problem in chapter five is highly relevant to the philosophical discussions on 
mathematical explanations. We objected to Stigler's argument that regression to the 
mean provides a full resolution to Darwin's problem, which implies that this 
resolution is mathematical and not causal. We tried to show why a full resolution to 
Darwin's problem must take into account the causal details of inheritance. Stigler's 
lucid presentation helps see the issues at stake more clearly. 
                                                           
7 This line of thought is compatible with recent work by Andersen (forthcoming) who suggests that 
mathematical and causal descriptions should be thought of as complementary explanations of 
phenomena. 
Whether the resolution to Darwin's problem is purely mathematical or not, and the 
little we can say here surely does not exhaust this debate, what is beyond dispute, 
and is beautifully presented by Stigler, is that a biological problem that concerned 
Galton led to an important discovery in the field of statistics. This, like many other 
examples in Stigler's book, reminds us of the tightly linked history of the fields of 
biology and statistics. 
Stigler reminds us how little use Darwin himself had for mathematics. In an 1855 
letter to William Darwin Fox he proclaimed "I have no faith in anything short of 
actual measurement and the Rule of Three," the Rule of Three being an arithmetic 
rule taught to elementary school kids: if a is to b, as c is to d, a can be deduced if b,c, 
and d are known. But, as Stigler explains, even the faith in the Rule of Three was 
misplaced. The Rule of Three fails whenever there is variation and correlation.  
Reflecting on Stigler's history seems to us to suggest that Darwin the naturalist, with 
his concentrated focus on variation and ecological interactions, had good reason to 
be suspicious of mathematics. The mathematics of his day was not up to the task of 
supporting the scientific program Darwin played a key role in. Variation and 
interactions were not as well understood mathematically as they are today.  
Another source suspicion, in the generations following Darwin, came from the 
limited biological insight offered by various idealized models, as recounted in Evelyn 
Fox Keller's 2003 Making sense of life: Explaining biological development with 
models, metaphors, and machines. Reading Keller's book together with Stigler's book 
is a good way to encourage students to reflect on the relations between biology and 
mathematics and physics (see Lamm, 2013 for further discussion of these relations).  
Mathematics, most prominently in the form of Statistics, developed in the years 
following Darwin's work, at least in part with the influence of biological questions. 
Understanding this rich history is helped significantly by reading this enjoyable and 
enlightening book.  
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